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Shafer theory to represent degrees of belief. The answers are provided within the 
transferable belief model interpretation of Dempster-Shafer theory as developed 
by the author. 
KEYWORDS" Belief unction, transferable belief model, Dempster-Shafer 
theory 
Judea Pearl has made an excellent presentation of many of the errors that 
pervade the belief function (BF) literature, some being put forward, even 
though Pearl knows their answer, for the mere purpose of provoking reactions. 
So it is a good opportunity for me to clarify the situation. I shall start with a 
summary of my interpretation of the use of belief functions to quantify 
someone's belief (called the transferable belief model) and follow on with a 
systematic refutation of Pearl's criticisms. Section and relation numbers pre- 
ceded by a P refer to Pearl's presentation i the paper dealt with in this special 
issue. 
1. THE TRANSFERABLE BELIEF MODEL (TBM) 
The transferable belief model (Smets [1]) is my interpretation of the Demp- 
ster-Shafer model. It fits in essentially with Shafer's initial presentation 
(Shafer [2]) except inasmuch as it rejects explicitly all connections with any 
probabilistic model. It is based on the following assumptions: 
1. Our degree of belief is quantified by a number between 0 and 1. 
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2. There exists a two-level structure: a credal level where beliefs are 
entertained and a pignistic level where beliefs are used to make deci- 
sions. 
3. Beliefs at the credal level are quantified by belief unctions. 
4. Beliefs at the pignistic level are quantified by probability functions. 
5. The credal evel precedes the pignistic level in that at any time beliefs are 
entertained (and updated) at the credal level, the pignistic level appearing 
only when a decision must be made. 
6. When a decision must be made, beliefs at the credal level are trans- 
formed into beliefs at the pignistic level; that is, there exists a transfor- 
mation, called the pignistic transformation, from belief functions to 
probability functions (Smets [3]). 
To describe the TBM, one starts with fl, a nonempty finite set called the 
frame of discernment, fl is equipped with the Boolean algebra 2 of some of 
its subsets. Every element of 2 is called a proposition. The singletons of fi 
correspond to what I call the most specific propositions. At most one most 
specific proposition of fl corresponds to the "actual" state of affairs. The 
singletons of fl can be seen as possible answers to a certain question, at most 
one answer being correct. A proposition of 2 is implied by the most specific 
proposition that corresponds to the "actual" state of affairs. 
A credal state on fi is a description of our subjective, personal judgment 
that the propositions A ~ 2 are true. It results from known, possibly inconclu- 
sive pieces of evidence that induce partial beliefs on the propositions of 2 .  It 
is an epistemic onstruct as it is relative to our knowledge. 
The transferable belief model postulates that the impact of a piece of 
evidence consists in allocating parts of  an initial unitary amount of belief 
among the propositions of  2 .  For A ~2,  m(A) is a part of our belief that 
supports A;  that is, that the "actual" state of  affairs is in A,  and, owing to 
lack of  information, does not support any strict subproposition of A.  The m's  
are called the basic belief masses (bbm's). 
I f  further evidence becomes available and implies that the proposition --, B is 
false, then the mass re(A) initially allocated to A is transferred to A&B, 
hence the name transferable belief model. This transfer of belief corresponds 
to Dempster's rule of  conditioning (except for the normalization factor). 
2. Probabilities: to be or not to be 
An important but often neglected distinction must be made between the 
following two types of  probabilistic reasoning (P. 1.3): 
Formally for every proposition A, bel(A) (to be read as "my belief that proposition A is true) 
will quantify my belief that one of the models of proposition A corresponds to the actual state of 
affairs. The most specific propositions are those propositions that are satisfied only by a unique 
minimal model. 
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TYPE 1 There exists a probability function P :  ~R ~ [0, 1] where ~ is the 
finite Boolean algebra of  propositions on which we rest our beliefs. But the 
values of P (A)  for A ~ ~ are only known to belong to some intervals whose 
limits are called the upper [P* (A) ]  and lower [P . (A)]  probabilities. For 
VA ~ ~R, one has 
P.( A) < P( A) < P*( A) (1) 
This is essentially the upper and lower probabilities (ULP) model. 
Dempster [4] created a similar model. He postulated the existence of a 
probability function Px on some space X and a one-to-may mapping M from 
X to Y. The probabilities P r  induced on Y by Px through M are such that 
the lower (upper) probabilities function is a belief (plausibility) function. Up to 
here, Dempster's model (which I call the PXMY model) is merely a 
particular form of the ULP model. 2 
In both the ULP and PXMY contexts, the interval [P r* (A) ,  Pr*(A)] and 
its length for A c y reflects the imprecision of our knowledge of P r (A) .  
TYPE 2 No probability function is postulated to exist on 3 .  The degree of 
belief given to A ~ ~ at the credal level is quantified by a point-valued 
function Bel(A). Neither additivity nor Cox's axioms are postulated. The 
TBM postulates the primitive concept of "part  of belief," the basic belief 
masses (bbm's). 3 Such a model corresponds closely to the one described in 
Shafer's book. 
But in more recent publications, Shafer became less radical. He accepts the 
existence of some underlying probability measure, but one of a very different 
nature than that of the ULP models. 4 He claims that the meaning of a piece of 
evidence is random. He speaks about the probability that the evidence means 
A,  nor the probability that A is true. His model is essentially a PXMY model 
(see his translator paradigm, Shafer and Tversky [7]). 
In type 2 context where underlying probability functions are not postulated, 
equations uch as 
be l (A)  < P(A) <<_ P I (A)  (2) 
are highly misleading. It is true that given a belief function and its associated 
plausibility function PI, there exists a set of compatible probability functions P 
that satisfy (2), but one must resist the temptation to give any interpretation to 
those probability functions other than that they are mathematical objects 
2 Mathematically, lower probability functions are capacities oforder 1. In the PXMY model the 
induced lower probability functions are capacities of infinite order; see Choquet [5]. 
3 Note that undefined concepts appear also in plain probability theory; the word "probability" 
itself is also a primitive concept! 
4 Shafer's ideas, but not the solution, are similar to those defended in the evidentiary value 
model (Gardenfors etal. [6]). 
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without relevance to our quantified belief. Only in type 1 context does the P 
function in (2) have a perfectly well defined relation with our belief. 
Pearl's definition of incomplete information (P.2) is really unusual. By 
incomplete knowledge, I mean knowledge that is insufficient to reduce the set 
of possible worlds into a single element. Should I know "everything," I would 
know in which world I am. The lack of complete knowledge is responsible for 
the fact that I can only express my beliefs about which world prevails. Whether 
that belief should be quantified by a probability function or a belief function is 
obviously the crucial question. 
Strat's [8] statement quoted by Pearl is indeed unfortunate as it leads one to 
believe that belief functions hould be used for "unavailable probabilities." If
"unavailable" means "it  exists but we don't know its value," then the ULP 
model is to be used. If  "unavailable" means "it  doesn't exist," then Strat is 
correct. Pearl's discussion and comments result from the inappropriate use of 
belief functions for typical ULP problems, a confusion unfortunately shared by 
many users of belief function theory. 
The lesson to be derived from this distinction is that the TBM is not a model 
for poorly known probabilities. For this case the appropriate model is the 
ULP model--maybe under the PXMY form, if one can explain the origin of its 
components. The TBM is a model that uses whatever is available, not a model 
to be used when some probabilities are missing. The reason for this formula- 
tion is that people will usually interpret the idea o f "  missing probabilities" not 
as absent probabilities but as existing probabilities whose values are missing. 
The correct statement should read more like "the TBM is a model in which we 
are ignorant of the existence of probabilities (whereas the ULP models are 
models in which we know of the existence of probabilities but are ignorant of 
their values). 
3. STATIC AND DYNAMIC COMPONENTS 
To study any model for quantified belief, one must consider not only its 
static component (how are beliefs allocated?) but also its dynamic ompo- 
nent (how are beliefs updated?). In the TBM, the static component corre- 
sponds to the bbm allocation, and the dynamic component to (1) the transfer 
of those basic belief masses among the propositions and (2) the combination 
of the beliefs induced by several pieces of evidence. 
It must be emphasized that any comparison of the TBM with other models 
must consider both components. Far too often, authors concentrate on the 
static component and discover many relations between the TBM and ULP 
models, inner and outer measures (Fagin and Halpern [9]), random sets 
(Nguyen [10]), probabilities of provability (Pearl [11]) (P. 1.4), probabilities of 
necessity (Ruspini [12]), etc. But these authors usually do not explain or justify 
the dynamic component, hat is, how updating (conditioning) is to be handled 
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(except in some cases by defining conditioning as a special case of combina- 
tion). So I feel that these partial comparisons are incomplete, especially as all 
these interpretations lead to different updating rules. 
Updating--Combination: Which Comes First? 
Shafer presents his model by introducing successively (1) the static compo- 
nent (the belief functions), (2) the combination process (Dempster's rule of 
combination), and (3) the updating process (Dempster's rule of conditioning) 
as a particular case of the combination process. We present he TBM by 
introducing successively (1) the static component ( he basic belief masses), (2) 
the updating process (the mass transfer), and (3) the combination process that 
we derive from the previous processes by requiring essentially the composi- 
tionality of the combination (i.e., bel I • bel 2 is only a function of bel 1 and 
bel2) (Smets [13]). I think this order of presentation of the TBM is more 
natural. 
Updating by a true fact (P. 1.3) is the most fundamental dynamic omponent. 
Later, one introduces the concept of updating by uncertain facts [as with 
Jeffrey's rule of conditioning (Jeffrey [14], Shafer [15])] and finally the concept 
of combining symmetrically two belief functions induced by two "distinct" 
pieces of evidence. That the two updating processes turn out to be mathemati- 
caUy special forms of Dempster's rule of combination is not required by the 
model. 
To show why I believe that the updating process precedes the combination 
process, let us examine the equivalent processes within the probabilistic 
framework. Remember that if both belief functions bel 1 and bel 2 are probabil- 
ity functions PI and P2, then Dempster's rule of combination can be reduced 
to ml2(X ) = P l2 (x )  = otPl(x)P2(x ) for xe  fi if (1) there are equal a priori 
probabilities on fl and (2) the two pieces of evidence that induced P1 and P2 
are conditionally independent for each x e ft. If one tries to define the 
conditioning as a special case of combination, the conditional probability 
P(xl X) is no longer defined as P(x)/P(X) for x~X. It is defined as the 
result of the combination (with the equal prior and the conditional indepen- 
dence being postulated) of the probability function P with a probability 
function P '  such that P ' (x )  = 1/ I  X I for x e X and 0 otherwise. Can such a 
new definition of the conditional probability be regarded as acceptable? It is 
mathematically correct but looks faintly surrealistic. To claim that conditioning 
with belief functions is a special form of combination is one and the same 
thing, and that is why I am not in favor of that kind of approach. 
4. WHAT IS TBM NOT? 
The TBM is not a model based on random sets or on upper and lower 
probabilities. They share the same static components but not the dynamic ones. 
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With random sets, conditioning should be performed by the application of the 
geometric rules (Suppes and Zanotti [16]), except in very twisted cases (Smets 
[17]). With upper and lower probabilities, the G-rule 5 is usually appropriate. 
A very important element of the TBM is its total lack of connection with any 
concept of randomness or additive probabilities. Whenever andomness (or 
decision) is involved, additive probabilities are, of course, perfectly appropri- 
ate, but this context is not the one covered by the TBM. In the TBM context 
(belief entertained outside any context of randomness or decision process), the 
use of additive probabilities to quantify our beliefs could be justified by axioms 
like those of Cox [19]. Cox Axiom 1 states that the belief of the negation of a 
proposition should be a function of the belief of the proposition 
belief(-~ A ) = f (be l ie f (A))  
Cox's axiom is too strong and not postulated in the TBM, and therefore the 
additive probabilities derived from it are not required in the TBM. 
I also dissociate the TBM from the PXMY model because Dempster's rule 
of conditioning can be criticized in the latter case. Why indeed should one 
apply Dempster's rule of conditioning in a PXMY context? (Levi [20]). When 
the truth is known to be mapped into a subset Z of Y, Dempster adapts the M 
mapping accordingly but does not update the initial probability distribution P 
on X by taking the new fact Z into account. I developed the TBM as a model 
totally unlinked to any underlying probability model just to avoid any such 
criticism. When I build a belief function on some space Y, I never postulate 
the existence of some space X endowed with a probability function and of a 
one-to-many mapping from X to Y. 
Beware nevertheless that the Bayesian analysis is always a particular case of 
the TBM analysis (P.5). The conclusions reached by a Bayesian analysis 
require more information than those reached by a TBM analysis. The fact is 
that in order to perform the Bayesian analysis, many probabilities must be 
specified on top of those used by the TBM analysis, and, of course, these extra 
specifications lead to results different from those reached by a TBM analysis 
that does not use them. If these extra specifications had also been introduced in 
the TBM analysis, both analyses would have led to the same results. In fact, all 
results derived from a Bayesian analysis can also be obtained from a TBM 
analysis if the same information is used in both analyses. 
5 The G-rule of conditioning is what Pearl calls FH conditioning [P.3.3, Eq. (19)]. Its 
description can be found in Dempster [4]. I called it the G-rule as I traced the work on upper and 
lower probabilities to Good's papers. (See also Planchet [18].) 
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5. OPEN OR CLOSED WORLDS? 
In [1] I explain the difference between the open- and closed-world assump- 
tions. Reconsider the definition of fi in Section 1. I postulate ither that at 
most  one most specific proposition of fl is true (open-world assumption) or 
that one and only one most specific proposition of fl is true (closed-world 
assumption). The normal izat ion results from the closed-world assumption. 
Shafer postulates the closed-world assumption. I generalize the problem, 
accept hat both contexts could exist, and select the appropriate assumption 
according to the problem under scrutiny (P. 1.3.3). 
Pearl could easily have generalized his description of Dempster's rule of 
combination i  P. 1.4 by dropping the statement "given that the two pieces of 
evidence are noncontradictory" or "to condition beliefs on the evidence being 
noncontradictory." Distinguishing between the open- and closed-world con- 
texts would have solved the "counterexamples" in P.1.4, for which the 
paradoxical results are due to the normalization factor. His criticisms on the 
adequacy of Dempster's rule of conditioning concern the normalization prob- 
lem more than the rule itself. Under an open-world assumption, there is no 
normalization when both of Dempster's rules are being applied. 
6. BELIEF ABOUT UNKNOWN PROBABILITIES 
The three examples in P.2.1 and the remarks in P.2.2 are irrelevant to belief 
functions; they are ULP problems. They correspond to the type 1 context as 
explained in Section 2. To grasp the origin of the confusion, let us analyze 
Example 1, the other two being solved identically. 
In Example 1 of P.2.1, fi is the simplex ABC (Figure 1) characterized by 
3 X = all three element vectors (Xl, x2, x3) where x i >_ 0 and ~i=1 i 1. [x  i 
represents he unknown P(E i ) .  ] The three pieces of evidence are x i ~ [0, 0.5], 
i = 1, 2, 3. For instance, the first piece of evidence induces a belief function 
with basic belief masses ml(AbaB)  = 1 (see Figure 1). The second and third 
pieces of evidence induce the basic belief masses m2(CacA)= 1 and 
m3(BcbC)  = 1. Their combination by Dempster's rule of combination leads 
to m123(abc) = 1. So any point in the triangle abc is a solution to the problem 
raised in Example 1. Similar results are derived if one considers the three 
inequalities of Pearl's Eq. (7) as a single piece of evidence that says only that 
the solution is in the triangle abc. 
The object language of the probabilities deals with the events E i. The object 
language of our belief deals with the vectors of probabilities (points in the 
simplex ABC) .  The belief statements do not concern the events E i. An open 
question is how to build your beliefs on E i given your beliefs on their 
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b a~, 
A ¢ B 
Figure 1. Simplex ABC. 
probabilities. The metalanguage (our belief statements) expresses our knowl- 
edge about which "object" (vector of probabilities) is true. Example 1 and the 
other two confuse the two levels. 
The introduction of bbm m i is, of course, not very useful in these examples. 
So in order to show what the differences between the object language and the 
metalanguage r ally is, I shall generalize the problem raised in Example 1 by 
considering, for example, that the bbm's m I are 
ml(Ab'a'B ) =0.3  m,(AbaB) =0.4 ,  m,(Ab"a"B) =0.2 ,  
m,(ABC) = 0.1 
which translates as, for example, 
I believe at level 0.3 that P(E~) <_ 0.25 
I believe at level 0.7 that P(E~) < 0.50 
I believe at level 0.9 that P(EI) <_ 0.75 
I believe at level 0.6 that 0.25 < P(EI) < 0.75 etc. 
I f  similar bbm's had been obtained for m 2 and m 3, then the full strength of the 
TBM could be realized. Many errors, like those of Pearl's three examples, 
derive from the fact that each belief function is characterized by one focal 
element and the expression bel [P(E l )  < 0.5] = 1 is translated into bel(E 0 = 
0.5. A belief about a probability of an event is not identical to a belief about 
the event. In these examples, the belief functions are analogous to the 
metaprobabilities (probabilities of order 2). 
As to the remark after Eq. (8) in P.2.1, I agree that the function defined 
by(P7) is not a belief function, but then I never claimed that lower probability 
functions are belief functions. They are unrelated. P. expresses one thing, Bel 
another. 
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7. THE UNSPOILING OF THE SANDWICH 
The sandwich principle raised in P.2.2, Example 4, and P.3.2 can be stated 
as 
bel (A)  e [be l (A IB) ,  bel( A I ~B)] (3) 
It is an important issue that must be solved as (3) is not required with the 
TBM. I shall present an example in which (3) seems not to be required, 
proceed to explain the relation between bel(A), be l (A IB  ), and be l (A l~B)  
as deduced from the generalized Bayes theorem and then why (3) is not 
required within the TBM, and, finally, answer a few specific questions raised 
by Pearl. 
7.1. Examples Against the Sandwich Principle 
Suppose a given person X who can be either male (M)  or female (F), 
young (Y) or old. I try to assess my belief that X is young. 
Consider the following pieces of evidence. 
El: A not fully reliable witness W 1 claims he saw X and says: "X  is not 
an old man." By "not fully reliable" I mean that maybe W 1 saw X 
and is telling the truth about X,  or maybe he did not see X and saw 
somebody else. 
E2: Another not fully reliable witness W 2 says: "X  is not an old 
woman." 
M I know that X is a man. 
F: I know that X is a woman. 
For simplicity's ake, let us accept hat the reliabilities of both witnesses are 
the same and that our prior belief about X ' s  age is independent of our 
knowledge about X ' s  sex. 
How would I compare bellz(Y) and bel lm(Y) where 
bell2 (Y) is the belief that X is young given E, and E z . 
bellm (Y)  is the belief that X is young given E I and M. 
Which of the following relations is more natural? 
bell2 (Y )  = bel,m (Y)  (4) 
bell2 ( r )  < bel,m (Y)  (5) 
bel lm(Y ) reflects the fact that X is male (known for sure) and W, was 
reliable when he said that "X  is not an old man." So bellM(Y) is related to 
the reliability given to W I. bel ~2(Y) results from the combination of the pieces 
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of evidence provided by the two witnesses. If both witnesses are reliable, then 
X is young. Otherwise I do not know. So bell2(Y) is related to the fact that 
both W 1 and W 2 are reliable. 
I personally feel that (4) is not required and (5) is more appropriate. But 
once (5) is accepted, it is proved below that 
bell2 (Y)  < min[bell2M(Y), be112,~ ( Y)] (6) 
where be112M(Y) and be112F(Y) are, respectively, the beliefs that X is young 
given the pieces of evidence E l, E 2, and M or F. They correspond, in fact, 
to the conditional beliefs that X is young given X is male or female (and E 1 
and E2). 
So the inequality (6) contradicts the "sandwich" principle described in (3) 
(P.3.2) because (6) is equivalent to 
bell2 (Y)  < min[bell2 (Y IM) ,  bell2 ( Y IF)]  
PROOF THAT (5) IMPLIES (6) The symmetry of the reliabilities implies that 
bellM = bel2F, SO (5) becomes bel12(Y ) < bel2F(Y). Once M is known, E 2 
becomes a tautology, so bellm = bell2 M. Identically, bel2F = bell2 F. Replac- 
ing bellM and bel2F in (5), one gets (6). • 
In conclusion, the sandwich principle might seem natural, though I think my 
example casts some doubt on any such naturalness. If you accept he sandwich 
principle, you must accept (4). [In fact, (4) results from a Bayesian analysis, 
whereas (5) results from a TBM analysis.] 
As another example, suppose you have three potential killers, A, B, and C. 
Each can use a gun or a knife. I shall select one of them, but you will not know 
how I select he killer. The killer selects his weapon by a random process with 
p(gun) = 0.2 and p(knife) = 0.8. Each of A, B, C has his own personal 
random device, the random devices are unrelated, and it just so happens they 
share the same probabilities (the 0.2 values). 
Suppose you are Bayesian and must express your "bel ief" that the killer 
will use a gun. The BF solution gives Bel(gun) = 0.2 x 0.2 × 0.2 = 0.008. 
What about you? Would you defend 0.2? But this applies only if I select he 
killer with a random device (in which case the BF solution also gives 0.2 as a 
result). But I never said I would use a random device; I might be a very hostile 
player and cheat whenever I can. 
So before assigning the killing to A, B, or C, I will order each of them to 
note, on a piece of paper, the weapon they would use if selected. They use 
their personal random device and note the name of the weapon they would use 
if selected. Suppose I am a hostile player. In that case, I would do whatever I 
could to show that your prediction about the weapon used is wrong. You 
express your belief about the gun, so if I can, I will assign the killing to 
somebody who wrote "knife" on his paper (I just look at the papers). So what 
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is the "chance" I cannot beat you? What is the probability that whatever I do 
you win? Answer: The chance that all three killers wrote "gun":  0.008. 
So your 0.008 belief for gun corresponds to the strength of your belief that 
whatever selection procedure I use--even the most hostile--you will win if 
you bet on "gun."  
So you could interpret bel(x) as the probability that you are sure to win 
whatever Mother Nature (however hostile) will do [and Pl(x) = 1 - (0.8 x 
0.8 x 0.8) then corresponds to what a most friendly Nature would do]. The 
betting behavior proposed by Stratt [8] is, in fact, based on these ideas. 
7.2. Marginal Beliefs Based on Conditional Beliefs 
Let flA and fls be two finite frames of discernment. Let ~A be an algebra 
on flA- Let ~ = {Bi: i = 1 . . . . .  n}, where the B i are  the most specific 
propositions of fiB" Suppose one knows BeI(A [ Bi) for each A eg~ A and 
each B; e ~.  Suppose the conditional belief functions are distinct. Let ~ s be 
an algebra on fls- Given some prior belief Bel 0 on ~B (with bbm mo), then 
the marginal bel(A) = bel(A[Ui~=lBi) defined on ~A is 
be l (A )= ~ {no(B  ) I I  bel(AIBi)} (7) 
B~ B B,e-~ ; B i ~_ B 
(This relation is deduced from the so-called conditional embedding underlying 
the generalized Bayes theorem; see Smets [21-25] and Sharer [26].) 
In Pearl's Example 4, I consider that I am in a state of total ignorance as 
regards fiB; hence, by (7), 
bel(A) = bel( A I B)bel( A l~B ) < min[bel( A l B), bel( A l -,B)] 
7.3. Why Is the Sandwich Principle Not Required? 
Let cyl(A), cyl(B), and cyl(-~B) be the cylindric extensions of A e~,4,  
B, and -~B~ s on the Cartesian product fl = fin X fiB" Let bel~ be the 
Belief function defined on fl that could generate the various bel(A), bel( A I B), 
and bel( A I -~ B) by marginalization r conditioning. 
Then 
bel(A) = beln[cyl(A) Icyl(B) V cyl(-~B)] 
bel( A I B) = bel u [cyl(A) I cyl(B)] 
bel( A I -~ B) = belu[cyl (A)  Icyl(-~ B)] 
All these belief functions concern the same event on fl[cyl(A)], but the last 
two result from some updating on some true facts [cyl(B) and cyl(-~B)]. In the 
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latter two cases we know more than in the first. It seems reasonable to accept 
that in some context he more we know the stronger our belief could be. 6 Each 
piece of evidence [the one inducing the updating on cyl(B) and the one 
inducing the updating on cyl(~B)] induces some information about cyl(A). 
That the resulting beliefs on A [bel(A [ B) and bel(A [ ~B)] are increased in 
both cases (min[bel(A[B),bel(A I-~B)] _> bel(A)) becomes perfectly ac- 
ceptable. In particular, when we know nothing, our belief is vacuous, and it 
will increase by the accumulation of new pieces of evidence. So our belief in 
cyl(A) increases also once we know that B is true (or that ~B is true). 
In fact, suppose one knows there is no a priori whatsoever on ~;  then (7) 
becomes 
n 
bel (A)  = 1-1 bel(AIBi) (8) 
i=1  
Hence with large n, bel(A) tends in general toward a vacuous belief function, 
which I consider to be perfectly reasonable. Should I have some probabilistic a 
priori on ~,  then bel(A) would be some weighted average of the bel (A[Bi )  
(as required by the sandwich principle). But when the belief on ~ is vacuous, 
the principle does not hold. That bel(A) tends to 0 reflects the fact that cyl(A) 
is hardly supported when n is large. 
7.4. Further Considerations 
1. The conclusions at the end of the second paragraph of P.2.2 are wrong. I 
agree that conditional beliefs bel(A[B i) for A in fl,4 within each 
context B i e ~ are usually the real foundation for expressing expert 
opinions and that there is no prior over the space ~ B. Our generalized 
Bayes theorem was developed with exactly that idea in mind. Pearl's 
criticism is inappropriate. It results, of course, from his erroneous 
requirement of relation (3). 
2. Consider the pork-eating problem (P.2.3, reasoning by cases). Again see 
relation (8) for the origin of the 0.63 result. Furthermore, one should be 
very careful when subdividing a category (the Jews) into subcategories. 
One must remember that relation (8) must be respected. Pearl's data 0.7, 
imply that there is an a priori basic belief mass rn on the four subcate- 
gories (OJ, C J, R J, NAJ) among the Jews such that 
0.70 = 0.999m(OJ) + 0.8m(CJ)  + 0.4m(RJ) + 0.2m(NAJ)  
+ (0.999)(0.8)m(OJ V CJ) + --" + (0.999)(0.8)(0.4) 
× (0.2) m(OJ V CJ V RJ V NAJ) 
6This argument does not mean that bel(A) will always increase as new pieces of evidence 
become known, as the latter could also be in contradiction with A. 
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How to derive m is still an open question. Should we apply the least 
commitment principle as advocated by Dubois and Prade, or minimized 
some measure of information (Smets [27])? 
8. De re and de dicto Conditionals 
Pearl (P.2.2 and P.2.3) raises the problems of the quantified conditional, 
already studied by Harper et al. [28]. In fact, most problems come from the 
ambiguity of the proposition: 
" I  believe that A implies B at level p"  (9) 
This could be translated into 
If A then [belief(B) = p] ,  A _ [belA(B) = p] de re interpretation 
or  
Belief(if A then B) = p ,  bel( A _ B) = p de dicto interpretation 
I call these two interpretations the de re and de dicto interpretations (Smets et 
al. [29]). 
The implication A _~ B is translated as a material implication -7 A v B. 
BelA(B) denotes the belief given to B in a context where A is true. It 
corresponds to bel(B [ A). 
With a belief function one has 
belA(B ) = bel(B[ A) = 
bel(-~A VB)  - be l ( -A )  
1 - be l (~A)  
=be l (~AVB)  =be l (A  DB)  
if bel(~ A) = 0, an accepted requirement as it only translates the idea that the 
knowledge of an implication should not induce any a priori belief on the 
antecedent domain. The de re and de dicto interpretations lead to the same 
results--a nice property that resolves most (if not all) conflicts related to the 
concept of probability of conditionals versus conditional probabilities (I~wis 
[30]). 
A particular case is raised in Pearl's footnote 5: If all we know is bel(If B 
then A) = p, then the use of bel(B D A) = be l (~BvA)  = p leads to the 
results derived by the deconditionalization process (called conditional embed- 
ding in Shafer [26]) ([see relation (7) with m(A  [ B) = p]). 
Using deconditionalization [see Eq.(7)], one can solve the case where I 
know that 
I believe at level Pi that B i implies A i for i -- 1 ,2 , . . . ,  n 
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with B i ~ ~ and A i ~ ~ A (see P.2.2). Each uncertain implication is translated 
into the simple support functions with m i(-~B i v A i) = Pi and combined via 
Dempster's rule of combination. 
Suppose that B e ~R a is known to be true. Then from (7) the belief function 
induced on A e ~ A by "B  is true" and the set of uncertain implications is 
be l (A]B)  = I'I be l (A lB i )  = I I  ciPi (10) 
B~B i: B,~B 
with c i = 1 if A i C A and 0 otherwise. 
It is a pity that these formulas [(7) and its special case (10)] never became 
very popular. In actual fact, they were completely ignored Let us hope that the 
present papers will help to promote them. 
9. CONSTRAINTS OR COMBINATIONS 
I would like to introduce another problem concerning the meaning to be 
given to the available information on our belief (P.2.3). 
SITUATION 1 With probability theory, one usually postulates the existence of 
some underlying probability function on some space and all pieces of evidence 
correspond to some constraints on this probability function [e.g., I know P(A)  
and P(B)  but not P(A&B)  as in P.2.1 Example 2]. 
SITUATION 2 With belief function theory, it is usually postulated that each 
piece of evidence induces a belief function on some space, that they are distinct 
(a concept hat incidentally still requires a formalized efinition), and that they 
must be combined through Dempster's rule of combination. 
The two situations are totally different. 
The first situation can also be encountered with belief functions even though 
I do not think it is often relevant. This is what Pearl tries to solve in P.2.1, 
Examples 1 and 2. In such partly defined belief functions, one can always try 
to apply the min imum commitment  approach of Dubois and Prade [31], that 
is, find the least committed belief function that satisfies the given constraints 
where bell is less committed than bel 2 if bell(A ) _< bel2(A)vA in t2. 
The second situation can also be encountered with probability functions, but 
it raises the problem of how to aggregate probabilities (Genest and Zidek, 
[32]). 
For instance, in (P.2.3, reasoning by cases) one must distinguish between 
the fact that Pearl's Eqs. (11) are either (1) two constraints on the same 
underlying belief function--in which case bel(B I A) = 0.9 and bel(B] ~A)  
= 0.7 and the least committed underlying belief function is such that m(B)  = 
0.6, m(AVB)  =0.1 ,  and m(~AVB)  =0.3 - -o r  (2) produced by two 
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distinct pieces of evidence, in which case one will obtain bel(B) = 0.63 by the 
application of Eq. (8) of the present paper. That solution does not run counter 
to common sense, as explained in Section 7. 
10. TWEETY SPLASHED BY THE SPRINKLER WHILE EATING 
HIS SANDWICH 7 
Tweety and the sprinkler examples deserve a full TBM analysis in order to 
avoid the erroneous conclusions derived from shallow analysis. 
Tweety Is an Atypical Bird 
The TBM analysis of the Tweety problem is the following. Let ~ = 
{TB, NTB, NB} where TB = typical bird, NTB = nontypical bird, and NB = 
non-bird. Let J~-= {F, ~F},  where F = "it  flies." The data are presented in 
Table 1. They translate as 
In general, typical birds fly. 
In general, nontypical birds do not fly. 
In general, non-birds do not fly. 
Furthermore, " in general, birds are typical birds" [bel(TB I--,NB) = 6]. ~ is 
the bbm given to TB t.J NB that is transferred to TB by the conditioning on 
~NB. 
CASE 1 
that 
Let it be known that Tweety is a bird. The application of (7) implies 
bel ( F I TB v NTB ) 
= m(TB ITB v NTB)bel(F ITB) 
+ m(NTB I TB v NTB)beI(F I NTB ) 
+ m(Ta v NTB I TB v NTa)bel (F  ITa)be l (F  INTB ) 
=t$ot 
bel(~ F I TB v NTB) = 0 
Table 1. Basic Belief Masses Allocated to F and -1F Given TB, NTB, 
and NB 
TB NTB NB 
F c~ 0 0 
-~F 0 /~ 3' 
7 P.2.3, chaining and Example 5. 
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CASE 2 Let it be known that Tweety is a penguin and all penguins are NTB. 
Then by (7), 
be I (F ]NTB)  --- 0 
bel(~FI  NTB) = /3 
and Tweety is still a bird as it should [bel(NTB) = 1, so bel(TB V NTB) = 1]. 
Who said that belief function theory is essentially a theory of monotonic logic? 
(See P.2.2.) 
CASE 3 Let it be known that Titi is a typical bird. Thus by (7), bel (F  I TB) = et, 
be l (~F ITB)  = 0, and bel(B) = 1. Hence our belief that typical birds fly is 
greater than our belief that birds fly, which is required (but not always derived 
in the penguin analysis). 
The TBM analysis of the Tweety example (and rules subject o exceptions) 
deserves a fuller treatment (see Smets and Hsia [33]). As shown in Case 2, the 
facts "Tweety is a penguin" and "Tweety is a bird" lead to bel(F) = 0 and 
bel(-~F) = /3, not to a vacuous belief function as claimed by Pearl (P.5). 
Sprinkler Is On and It Does Not Rain 
The sprinkler problem is indeed a tricky one, but so it is with many 
probabilistic problems (see Sz6kely [34]). 
Let 
S = "Sprinkler was on"  
R = " I t  rained" 
W = "Ground is wet"  
J=  {s, ~s} 
= {R, ~R} 
~= { W, -W} 
bell(S_D W) = 1 
be lz (R _D W)  = 1 
bel3(W_D SV R) = 1 
bel4(-s)  = 
The belief functions express that the antecedents "Sprinkler was on"  (bell) or 
" I t  rained" (bel2) imply the consequent "Ground is wet"  and no other causes 
could be invoked (bel3). bel 4 expresses that usually sprinklers are not on. 
The vacuous extension of the four belief functions on the product space 
5e× ~ × W and their combination induces the belief function whose basic 
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belief masses are 
m((~W,~S,~R)  v (W,~S,R) )  =~ 
m((-~W,-~S,-~R) V(W,S ,=R)V(W, -~S,R)V(W,S ,R) )  = 1-¢x 
By conditioning on S, ot is transferred to ~1, and 1 - ot is transferred to 
(W,S). So after normalization, bel(S) = 1, bel(W) = 1, and bel(R) = 0, as 
it should. 
By conditioning on W, c~ is transferred to (W, =S, R) and 1 -oz  to 
(W, S, -~R) V (W, -~S, R) V (W, S, R). So bel(W) = 1 and bel(R) = ¢x, 
which translates the idea that "Ground is wet" suggests " I t  rained." 
The paradoxes described by Pearl do not exist when belief functions are 
used correctly. 
The Peter, Paul, and Mary Sandwich s
Consider the product space C× S where C= {H,T}  and S= {h, t}  
(translation: Coin, Head, Tail, Sandwich, ham, turkey). Let the four elements 
of C × S be a = (H ,  h), b = (H ,  t), c = (T, h), d = (T, t). The problem 
is to build a belief function on C x S. We know that P r (H)  = Pr(T) = 
bel(T) = 0.5. [I think we should always accept Hacking's frequency principle: 
If Pr(x) = p then bel(x) = p.] So on C × S, 
be l (aU b) =be l (cUd)  = 0.5. 
Next what are be l (H  I h) and be l (H  [ t)? The first remark is that they must 
satisfy the constraint 
'be l (n lh )  = x'------- 'bel(nlh ) = x '  
whatever x (here x = 0.5). The only way to build a belief function on C × S 
such that this constraint is always satisfied is to allocate the basic belief masses 
on C × S such that m(a U b) = m(c U d) = 0.5. It satisfies all constraints 
[the one relative to bel(a U b) and the very strong "correlation" 'be l (H  I h) 
= x ' - 'be l (H[  t) = x ' ] .  
What is the chance that Paul will win $1000? To win (W)  is equivalent to 
obtaining a U d. If Paul knows that the sandwich is h, then his chance of 
winning is 0.5. (and the same for turkey). (One has bel(W I h) = be l (H [ h) 
= Pr (H]  h) = 0.5, etc.] 
I f  Paul does not know which sandwich was prepared, then bel(W) = bel(a 
U d) = 0 = be l (~W) = bel(b U c). But if Paul must bet on W, which, of 
course, is his real problem (the $1000 attests to it), then Paul builds his 
s P.3.2, Example 5. 
338 Philippe Smets 
pignistic probabilities on C x S by applying my pignistic transformation [3]. 
The 0.5 basic belief mass given to a L Ib  is split equally between a and b (and 
the same for the other 0.5). So each singleton of C x S receives a BetP of 
0.25, and BetP(W) = BetP(a) + BetP(d) = 0.5, as requested by Pearl. 
Other Paradoxes 
Most paradoxes raised by Pearl in P.2.3 (contraposition) are paradoxes 
related to the translation of I F . . .  THEN by material implications. They exist 
in logic and are unrelated to the use of belief functions. 
I consider it logically correct o state " I f  you are hungry, you haven't eaten 
cakes." That it is not a useful statement is irrelevant. One should be careful 
not to confuse truth and usefulness. 
With regard to the bird, in a world with "only"  birds, the translation of 
"typical birds fly" has to be done as with Tweety. Two categories must be 
created: Typical birds (those who usually fly) and Nontypical birds (those who 
usually do not fly). The paradox then disappears. 
With the kind person, if all I know are the two rules given by Pearl, then I 
cannot understand Pearl's conclusion. I feel that it is perfectly reasonable to 
belief that Joe is unkind (with strength m2). Note that the same conclusion 
(and Pearl's dissatisfaction) would appear in plain logic. Given the two rules, 
F will imply ~K.  To avoid such a conclusion--as eems to be Pearl's 
intention--there must be further rules. I f  someone would only tell me what 
they are, I would include them in the TBM analysis. Dissatisfaction with BF 
models is often due to the fact that only some rules are considered, which then 
lead to unsatisfactory conclusions. But the reason these conclusions are unsatis- 
factory is that there are extra constraints we would like to see fulfilled but did 
not include in our initial analysis. Introduce them in the TBM analysis, and the 
results will be satisfactory. 
11. THE THREE PRISONERS PROBLEM 
The three prisoners problem (P3.1) is a nice problem that deserves a TBM 
analysis. Let A 1, A 2, and A 3 be the three prisoners. Everybody knows that 
one prisoner is going to be executed and two are going to be saved. I (At)  call 
the guard and ask him to give me the name of one of the other two prisoners 
who is going to be saved. He answers A3. Should I change my belief that I 
will be executed given that I know that A 3 is going to be saved? 
Before I ask the guard, my belief that the executed prisoner S was A 1 was 
bel(S = Ai) = 1/3. It was based on the accepted idea that the judge would 
randomly select (with probability 1/3) the prisoner who would be executed. 
Two situations could then be considered. 
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CONTEXT 1 The guard looked over the judge's shoulder, saw the result of the 
selection, came to my cell, and told me "A  3 is saved." This is equivalent to 
saying "A  3 was not selected": Conditioning on ~ A 3 seems to be realistic. 
Hence my belief that I would be executed increased to 1/2. 
bel(S = A 1 IS ::# As) = 1/2 
This is how the solution disliked by Pearl is arrived at. But it does not 
correspond to the context hat concerns Pearl. The context hat Pearl uses is the 
following: 
CONTEXT 2 I called the guard, told him I knew that one of A 2 or A 3 had to 
be saved and that knowing the name of the one of those who would be saved 
would not change my belief that I would be executed, so the guard could 
answer my question. And so he did. Why did he agree? Because the guard had 
made sure that answering the question would not change my belief about being 
executed. To reach this goal, all he had to do was to make it clear to me that he 
would select with probability 1/2 between A 2 and A 3 if I was going to be 
executed. In such a case, the TBM analysis is reduced to a plain probabilistic 
analysis. One gets 
bel(S = A I Iguard agrees to answer and says S :# A3) : 1/3 
The TBM and probability solution are identical, which is normal, as the 
probability solution corresponds to the TBM solution whenever beliefs happen 
to be additive. 
12. DECISION MAKING 
Pearl (P. 1.4) raises the problem of decision based on belief unctions. A 
frequent error consists in interpreting bel(A) as the maximal rate at which one 
would be willing to bet on event A. This interpretation concerns lower 
probabilities, not belief functions. In both the Shafer and TBM interpretations 
bel(A) provides only the strength of our belief that A is true. It does not 
directly claim the probability that A is true, as A may be true by chance over 
and above the necessity implied by bel(A). Where betting context is con- 
cerned, let me refer to the paper (Smets [3]) in which I explain what pignistic 
probability is--the probability derived from my belief and used in order to bet 
"coherently." Beliefs quantified by belief function analysis can be used as a 
basis for rational decision making. Once decision is involved, our belief 
function is transformed into an additive measure (a probability function) on the 
set of alternatives, and decisions are then based on these probabilities (and the 
utilities involved). 
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Tu quoque Judea  
The translation of the sandwich principle into decision theory cannot be used 
as a criticism against belief function analysis. The fact is, the principle is 
violated even within probability theory as shown by the Newcomb paradoxes 
(Eells [35], Giirdenfors and Sahlin [36]). 
As an example of such a paradox, take the story of King David and 
Bath-sheba. King David fell in love with Bath-sheba, Uriah's wife. He could 
easily have sent his guards to get her but worried about the consequences of
such an act. The pleasure of Bath-sheba's company had to be weighed against 
the risk that this iniquitous act would cause a revolt, which for him would be 
disastrous. So he was going to abstain when the grand vizier Seyab explained 
to him that revolts result from lack of charisma, not from iniquitous acts. 
Either a king has charisma and revolts are unlikely or he does not have 
charisma and revolts are likely. That he has committed iniquitous acts is 
irrelevant in both contexts. So why not enjoy Bath-sheba's presence? Where 
does the paradox come from? 
ORIGIN OF THE PARADOX The fact is, King David was well versed in 
statistics and decision theory, so before deciding he collected data from a 
hundred previous kings on their charisma status (C), on whether they had 
committed iniquitous acts (B), and on whether there had been a revolt (R). 
These data are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The utility of each act and 
consequences are given in Table 4. 
King David's first computation is based on the probabilities given in Table 3 
when he did not consider the charisma status. In that case, the expected utilities 
are 
26 19 
- -  << u(~S)  = -~.  5--6 u(B)  = - 50  
As /3 is much larger than e, King David should not send his guards to get 
Bath-sheba. 
Tab le  2. Distribution of 100 Kings According to Charisma (C), and 
Committing of Iniquitous Acts (B), and the Occurrence of Revolt (R) 
C ~C 
B -~B B ~B 
R 2 3 24 16 
~R 18 27 6 4 
20 30 30 20 
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Table 3. Distribution of 100 Kings According to the Committing of 
Iniquitous Acts (B) and Occurrence of Revolt (R) 
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B ~B 
R 26 19 
-~R 24 31 
But if King David considers his charisma status (in which case the probabili- 
ties are those given in Table 2), one gets 
• If King David has charisma, 
2 3 
u(B)  = - [3.2--6 > u( - ,B )  = - [3 .3 -6  
• If King David does not have charisma, 
24 16 
u( B ) = e - [3. 3--0 > u(-~ B ) = - [3"  2-6 
So in both contexts, King David should send his guards and get Bath-sheba. 
What are we to make of this? 
The sandwich principle questioned once already in Section 7 does not stand 
up to criticism within strict probability theory. 
13 CONCLUSION 
I think I have answered all of Pearl's criticisms against belief functions and 
therefore also against he TBM. 
Pearl complains about the lack of effective procedure for deciding whether a 
problem can be represented by belief functions. He is right, but I would also 
like to have an effective procedure for deciding whether a problem can be 
represented by a probability function (or possibility functions, or fuzzy sets 
theory, etc.). 
I think it is equally important o look for a procedure that could correctly 
describe a BF problem (see the Tweety, sprinkler, and pork-eating solutions). 
Tab le  4. Utility of Each Act (B or -7 B) and Consequence (R or -~ R)* 
u B ~B 
R - /3+e -/3 
~R e 0 
*e is the (positive) utility that results from Bath-sheba's company; -fl is the (strongly negative) 
utility that results from revolt (fl >> e). 
342 Philippe Smets 
It is so awfully easy to be wrong. But this is, unfortunately, not specific for 
belief function analysis. Just consider the case where you collect the condi- 
tional probabilities on A given B, on B given C, and on C given A. 
Careless manipulations could easily lead to absurdity as many constraints 
underlying the three sets of conditional probabilities might be violated. 
The comparison between belief functions and likelihood is not so enlighten- 
ing. In fact, a more interesting relation exists between likelihood and possibil- 
ity theory (Smets [37]). 
I wish to apologize for possibly being somewhat harsh in some of my 
replies. I was very happy that Pearl's paper provides me with an opportunity to 
show how the TBM can resist assaults of that kind, Pearl's criticism, unfortu- 
nately, reflects the status of BF literature. I think the foundation of any models 
for quantifying belief is a very important and all too often neglected topic. To 
use belief function theory and Dempster's rules blindly can be very dangerous 
indeed. Their use must be justified by the nature of the problem to which they 
are applied, not by fashionable or ad hoc arguments. 
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